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AMENDED BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment and Order of Commitment
Eighth District Court
Uintah County, State of Utah
Honorable A. Lynn Payne, Judge

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Donald Arthur Harley, Defendant and Appellant, through counsel, appeals his
jury convictions for two counts of aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony, Utah
Code Ann. §76-5-302 (1996); one count of aggravated burglary, a first degree
1

felony, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (1989); one count of possession of a dangerous
weapon, a third degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a) (1997); and one
count of tampering with evidence, as a party, a second degree felony, Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-510 (1973). The supreme court poured over this appeal to the court of
appeals, which has jurisdiction to hear it pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78-2-2(3)(i)
and 78-2a-3(2)G).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.
WITH STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1
Did the trial court err when it denied Harley's motion to dismiss the one
count of aggravated burglary at preliminary hearing, on grounds that Harley never
entered the Jenkins' house and the State conceded the point? Standard of review:
A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal cases are reviewed for correctness.
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993).
Issue 2
Did the trial court err when it convicted Harley of one count of aggravated
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burglary, despite the fact that Harley never entered the Jenkins' house and the State
conceded the point? Standard of review: A trial court's conclusions of law in
criminal cases are reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman, supra.
Issue 3
Was there prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor, in opening
statement, argued to the jury that aggravated burglary does not require the actor to
enter or remain unlawfully in a dwelling? Standard of review: Prosecutorial
misconduct occurs when the actions or remarks of the prosecutor call to the
attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining
its verdict and, under the circumstances of the particular case, the error is substantial
and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there
would have been a more favorable result. State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1118
(Utah App. 1995).
Issue 4
Did plain error occur when the trial court, over Harley's objection, allowed
the prosecutor, in opening statement, to argue to the jury that aggravated burglary
3

does not require the actor to enter or remain unlawfully in a dwelling? Standard of
review: Plain error occurs when there is an error, it should have been obvious to the
trial court, and it is harmful to the defendant. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208
(Utah 1993).
Issue 5
Did the trial court err in issuing jury instruction 24, stating that an attempt to
unlawfully enter a building or any portion thereof is an element of the offense of
aggravated burglary? Standard of review: Even without a formal objection on the
record, appellate courts will review instructions for error in order to avoid manifest
injustice. Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). The standard of review utilized is plain error.
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989).
Issue 6
Did the trial court err when it convicted Harley of two counts of aggravated
kidnaping, by barring defense counsel as matter of law from arguing, in closing
argument, that time and distance were important jury considerations in the
determination of whether there had been a seizing, confining, detaining or
4

transportation within the meaning of the aggravated kidnaping statute? Standard of
review: A trial court's interpretations of law in criminal cases are reviewed for
correctness. Thurman, supra.
Issue 7
Did the trial court err in issuing jury instruction 18, over Harley's objection,
informing the jury that neither time nor distance are elements of aggravated
kidnaping and that to prove the offense the State does not need to show that the
victim was seized, confined or detained for any particular amount of time or
transported for any particular distance? Standard of review: The standard of review
for jury instructions to which counsel has objected is correctness. State v. Bryant,
348 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44 (CA, 8-13-98),

P.2d

(Utah App. 1998).

Issue 8
Was there sufficient evidence to convict Harley of possession of a dangerous
weapon? Standard of review: Defendant must marshal all evidence supporting the
jury's verdict and must then show this marshaled evidence is insufficient to support
the verdict even when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v.
Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992).
Issue 9
Was there sufficient evidence to convict Harley, as a party, of tampering with
5

evidence? Standard of review: Defendant must marshal all evidence supporting the
jury's verdict and must then show this marshaled evidence is insufficient to support
the verdict even when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v.
Lemons, supra.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-302, Aggravated kidnaping.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203. Aggravated burglary.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a). Possession of a dangerous weapon.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510. Tampering with evidence.
These statutes are set forth verbatim in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
The State charged Harley with five counts: (I) aggravated kidnaping of Ted
Jenkins, a first degree of felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-302 (1996);
(II) aggravated kidnaping of Darrell Jenkins, a first degree felony, in violation of

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-302 (1996); (III) aggravated burglary, a first degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (1989); (IV) possession of a dangerous
weapon, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-503(3)(a)
(1997); and (V) evidence tampering, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §76-8-510(1973).
B. Course of Proceedings
Preliminary hearing was held on June 20, 1997. Harley, ^t that time, moved
the court to dismiss count three, aggravated burglary, specifically on grounds that he
did not enter the Jenkins' home and the State conceded the point. See Prelim. Tr.
81 f, 92. In support Harley cited State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995),
containing dicta by then Chief Justice Zimmerman, at 862, that "Aggravated
burglary always requires proof that the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in
a building." The trial court denied Harley's motion. It subsequently bound him
over on all charges.
Ultimately a two-day jury trial was held on September 22 and 23, 1998. At
trial the State conceded, in opening statement, that neither Harley nor Gooch
7

entered the Jenkins' home. See Tr. 168,11. 21-24: "[I]n this case, we are not going
to argue that the burglary occurred because they entered the house. There will be
no evidence that they entered the house."
C. Disposition at Trial Court
The jury found Harley guilty on all five counts. The trial court subsequently
sentenced him to the Utah State Prison as follows: Count (I), aggravated kidnaping
of Ted Jenkins, five years to life, with a minimum mandatory sentence of fifteen
years; Count (II), aggravated kidnaping of Darrell Jenkins, five years to life, with a
minimum mandatory sentence of fifteen years; Count (III), aggravated burglary, five
years to life; Count (IV), possession of a dangerous weapon, zero to five years; and
Count (V), tampering with evidence, one to fifteen years. Counts (I), (II), (IV) and
(V) were to be concurrent with each other but consecutive to Count (III). In
addition, Harley was ordered to serve one additional year, consecutive to all other
charges, as the jury found that he used a dangerous weapon in furtherance of a
felony.

8

RELEVANT FACTS
In reviewing a jury verdict, the court views the evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict. Harley recites
the facts of this case accordingly. State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 379 (Utah App.
1997).
Ted and Betty Jenkins are a retired married couple living in Vernal, Utah. Tr.
184. On May 21, 1997, at home, the Jenkins' babysat their granddaughter. Tr. 185.
About 9:30 p.m. their son, Darrell Jenkins, picked up the child. Id. Darrell and she
went to their own home which is next door, 100-150 feet away. Tr. 183. Ted and
Betty Jenkins then prepared to go to bed. Tr. 186.
A little later, Donald Arthur Harley and Harry Gooch drove into the Jenkins'
driveway and got out of their van. Unknown to Harley and Gooch, Ted Jenkins had
heard the vehicle, and his suspicions aroused, gone out the back door and around
the side by a back gate to investigate. Tr. 189. Gooch went to the front door and
knocked. However, when Betty opened the door, no one was there. Tr. 319.
Harley was talking with Jenkins by the back gate. Gooch joined them. Tr. 191.
9

At that point Harley and Gooch tried to grab Jenkins, the latter yelled for help, and
Harley announced, "This is a robbery" and demanded entry into the house. Tr. 19293. During the scuffle Jenkins was knocked to the ground and sustained a cut to his
head. Id. Hearing his father's scream, Darrell Jenkins immediately ran over from
his house. Tr. 214. He saw Gooch holding a pistol. Id. He subsequently saw
Harley holding it, when Harley and Gooch marched them to the back door of the
house. Tr. 216. The back door was locked. Tr. 215. Betty Jenkins had observed
what had happened, locked the door and phoned 911 for help. Tr. 320-21.
Realizing that their plan had gone awry, Harley and Gooch turned away and fled.
Tr. 217. They jumped in their van and headed north out of town. Id. Dan-ell
Jenkins ran to his vehicle in his drive way, caught up with and followed Harley and
Gooch, and during this time used a cell phone to speak with the 911 operator and
give police directions. Tr. 218. Police intercepted and arrested Harley and Gooch.
Tr. 241. While in pursuit, police observed a pistol thrown from the van. Tr. 243. It
was recovered and placed into evidence. Tr. 245.

10

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Harley has been wrongly convicted of aggravated burglary. Aggravated
burglary always requires proof that the actor entered or remained unlawfully in a
dwelling. Harley never entered the Jenkins' house; the State conceded that point at
both preliminary hearing and trial. Therefore Harley could not have committed
aggravated burglary. Utah case law supports the view that a necessary element of
aggravated burglary is entering or remaining. Fundamental principles of statutory
construction support the view. Prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the
prosecutor, in opening statement, informed the jury that aggravated burglary does
not require entering. Plain error occurred then as well. Jury instruction 24, defining
aggravated burglary as attempting to enter a building, was issued in error.
Harley also has been wrongly convicted of aggravated kidnaping. His
detention of Ted Jenkins and Darrell Jenkins was slight, inconsequential and merely
incidental to another crime. Detention was inherent in the other crime. Detention
had no significance independent of the other crime in that it made the other crime
substantially easier to commit or substantially less likely to be detected. Jury
11

instruction 18, stating that time and distance need not be considered in determining
whether kidnaping occurred, was issued in error. It also was error that defense
counsel, in final argument, was precluded from arguing that time and distance were
important jury considerations in the determination of whether an aggravated
kidnaping had occurred within the meaning of the law. Harley, in the facts of this
case, did not commit aggravated kidnaping of either Ted Jenkins or Darrell Jenkins.
There is insufficient evidence to support Harley's conviction for either
possession of a dangerous weapon or tampering with evidence.
ARGUMENT
I.

DICTA IN BROOKS CORRECTLY STATES THE LAW;
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY ALWAYS REQUIRES
PROOF THAT THE DEFENDANT ENTERED OR
REMAINED UNLAWFULLY; UTAH CASE LAW
SUPPORTS THIS VIEW; FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
SUPPORT IT; PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
OCCURRED DURING OPENING STATEMENT;
PLAIN ERROR OCCURRED THEN; JURY
INSTRUCTION 24 WAS ISSUED IN ERROR.
A. The Aggravated Burglary Statute

12

Harley's first assignment of error is that he was bound over and subsequently
convicted of aggravated burglary despite the fact that he did not enter a dwelling
and the State conceded the point. He argues that because he did not enter or
remain, that is, because he did not engage in burglary, Utah Code Ann. §76-6202(1), he did not engage in aggravated burglary. This argument finds support in
then Chief Justice Zimmerman's dicta in Brooks: "Aggravated burglary always
requires proof that the defendant entered or remained in a building...." Brooks,
supra, at 862.
The State, at preliminary hearing and trial, pointed to the language in the
aggravated burglary statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203: "(1)A person is guilty of
aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a burglary the
actor or another participant in the crime: (a) causes bodily injury to any person who
is not a participant in the crime; (b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a
dangerous weapon against any person who is not a participant in the crime;..."
(emphasis added). It argued that Harley's attempt to enter the Jenkins' house,
coupled with the injury to Ted Jenkins and use of a pistol, constituted aggravated
13

burglary within the meaning of the statute.
Harley believes that the State reads the statute too expansively and for that
reason incorrectly. Chief Justice Zimmerman, in Brooks, was fully aware of the
phrase "attempting" in the definition of aggravated burglary. He included it in his
quotation of the statute. Id. He nonetheless persisted in stating that, for aggravated
burglary to occur, the actor must enter or remain unlawfully in a building.
The dicta in Brooks, while dicta, is a correct statement of the law. The court
of appeals has interpreted the aggravated burglary statute in a consistent manner.
See State v. Peterson, 881 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1994). In Peterson, defendant was
convicted of aggravated burglary. At issue was the trial court's refusal to give
requested jury instructions for lesser included offenses including attempted
aggravated burglary. The court of appeals upheld the trial court, on grounds that
another participant in the crime had entered the victim's dwelling. The court
pointed out, in a footnote, that "If entry occurred, the attempt offenses would
logically be excluded." At 968, n. 3. This implies, at the very least, that if the other
participant in the crime did not enter or remain unlawfully the jury should have
14

received defendant's requested instruction for attempted aggravated burglary. The
court of appeals clearly is saying that "attempting ... a burglary," as that phrase is
used in the aggravated burglary statute, is not identical to attempted aggravated
burglary when the actor does not enter or remain.
Two more recent discussions of aggravated burglary demonstrate that entry or
remaining is a necessary element of the crime. In State v. Betha, 341 Utah Adv.
Rep. 8 (CA, 4-23-98),

P.2d

(Utah App. 1998), the court upheld defendant's

conviction of aggravated burglary. The elements of aggravated burglary presented
at trial were reviewed. They were "that defendant (1) entered and remained
unlawfully in [the victim's] apartment; (2) with intent to commit a felony or an
assault; and (3) while committing the burglary ... both caused bodily injury ... and
used and threatened to use a gun..." (emphasis added). At 13. In State v. Rudolph,
349 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (SC, 7-31-98),

P.2d

(Utah 1998), the court upheld

defendant's conviction of aggravated burglary, in part on grounds that while
defendant did not have intent to commit an assault upon entry he did form the
necessary intent while remaining unlawfully.
15

Consistent with these cases, Harley believes that the unambiguous meaning of
the aggravated burglary statute, specifically the phrase "attempting ... a burglary," is
that the actor must make an attempt of some kind after he already has entered a
building or dwelling. Numerous scenarios suggest themselves. For example, an
actor possessing a dangerous weapon could attempt to remain inside a home after
permission to be there has been revoked. The actor is attempting a burglary.
However, an actual aggravated burglary is involved because the actor possesses a
dangerous weapon. The court of appeals should continue to interpret the aggravated
burglary statute in this manner, that is, in conformity with its plain meaning. "'A
fundamental principle of statutory construction is that unambiguous language in the
statute itself may not be interpreted so as to contradict its plain meaning.'"
Epperson v. Utah State Retirement Board, 949 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah App. 1997)
(quoting Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 770 P.2d 93, 95 (Utah 1988)).
The aggravated burglary statute, in its present form, does not expressly
extinguish the crime of attempt, Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101. Therefore attempt, as
an offense, and aggravated burglary, as an offense, stand as separate and equal parts
16

in the criminal code. To read the aggravated burglary statute, as the State urges, in
effect would eliminate attempted aggravated burglary as a crime. This itself violates
other fundamental principles of statutory construction. Separate parts of an act
should not be construed in isolation from the rest. The meaning of any part of an act
should harmonize with the purpose of the whole act. Jensen v. Intermountain
Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984). The legislature clearly intends
attempted aggravated burglary to remain a separate offense, not subsumed under
aggravated burglary. Attempted aggravated burglary, as distinct from aggravated
burglary, can take many forms. One example is that an actor did not enter or remain
unlawfully in a building or dwelling, but in attempting to do so, he possessed or
used a dangerous weapon or caused a victim bodily injury.
Harley consequently urges the court of appeals to hold that aggravated
burglary requires that the actor enter or remain unlawfully in a building or dwelling.
Such a holding is dictated by Chief Justice Zimmerman's correct statement of the
law in Brooks, analysis of the elements of aggravated burglary in other case law in
this jurisdiction, and fundamental principles of statutory interpretation including
17

plain meaning and harmonization of statutes.
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Harley next assigns as error the prosecutor's interpretation of the aggravated
burglary statute as not requiring entry or remaining, during opening statement. The
following exchange took place at the beginning of trial:
[Ms. Stringham]: ...[T]his defendant is charged with aggravated burglary. An
aggravated burglary occurs when there is bodily injury caused or uses or threatens
the use of a dangerous weapon. When that occurs it becomes aggravated burglary.
And, in that particular case, you don't have to enter a house to commit a burglary.
Statute says attempting.
[Mr. Baden]: ...I would object. I believe that Miss Stringham is improperly-is arguing the law during her opening statement. And if the court wishes to overrule
me, I just ask that the court note my exception for the record.
[Ms. Stringham]: And I am done, your Honor.
[The Court]: You may continue. I'll overrule that. A very brief statement as
to the law is, I think, appropriate in this situation. I don't think she's gone beyond
18

where she should go.
[Ms. Stringham]: Thank you, Judge. So, in this case, we are not going to
argue that the burglary occurred because they entered the house. There will be no
evidence that they entered the house. I just want to remind you to remember—and,
again, you will get the jury instructions—an aggravated burglary can occur because
there was bodily injury. If you find there was bodily injury or a dangerous weapon,
simply attempting to commit a burglary is sufficient. Tr. 168,1. 4 to 169,1.3.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the prosecutor misstated the law—
that in her words aggravated burglary does not require entry or remaining
unlawfully—prosecutorial misconduct occurred. Harley acknowledges the
recognized two-part test for such misconduct: '"the actions or remarks of [the
prosecutor] call to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in
considering in determining its verdict and, if so, under the circumstances of the
particular case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a
reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable
result.'" State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1118 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State v.
19

Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 1990)). Here, the prosecutor misstated the
law, thereby calling to the jury's attention a matter it was not justified in considering
in determining its verdict. Had the jury been informed properly, it would not have
convicted Harley of aggravated burglary since he did not enter or remain unlawfully
in the Jenkins' home.
C. Plain Error
In the alternative, plain error occurred. The three-part test for plain error,
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993), is satisfied readily. An error
occurred, specifically the prosecutor's misstatement of law during opening
statement. The error should have been obvious to the trial court. It was put on
notice, at preliminary hearing, that the aggravated burglary statute requires entry or
remaining. The error was harmful. Harley was convicted of an offense that he in
fact did not commit.
D. Jury Instruction 24
Harley next assigns as error jury instruction 24. That instruction stated, in
part, "[P]roof of the commission of the crime of Aggravated Burglary as charged in
20

the Information requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the following:
1. Donald Arthur Harley;... 4. Did himself, or as a party, attempt to unlawfully
enter a building or any portion thereof;...." Harley, as a matter of record, did not
object to the instruction given objections already raised at preliminary hearing and
earlier at trial. Failure to object is not fatal, however, as appellate courts review
jury instructions for error in order to avoid manifest injustice. Utah R. Crim. P.
19(c). The standard of review utilized is plain error. State v. Verde, 110 P.2d 116,
121-22 (Utah 1989). Plain error already has been discussed, supra. Here, in brief,
an error occurred, namely that instruction 24 did not correctly define the offense of
aggravated burglary. The error should have been obvious because of repeated
discussions involving counsel and the court about the proper definition of
aggravated burglary. The error harmed Harley because he was convicted of an
offense without any proof whatsoever about a key element, entering or remaining
unlawfully in the Jenkins' home.

21

II.

JURY INSTRUCTION 18 WAS ISSUED IN
ERROR; THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
FOLLOWED PERRY; THE JURY SHOULD HAVE
BEEN ALLOWED TO CONSIDER TIME AND
DISTANCE AS FACTORS IN DETERMINING
WHETHER AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING
OCCURRED; FINLAYSON, ADOPTING THE
BUGGS TEST, IS NOW CONTROLLING;
HARLEY, IN THE FACTS OF THIS CASE,
DID NOT COMMIT AGGRAVATED
KIDNAPING.
A. Jury Instruction 18

Harley next assigns as error jury instruction 18. Counsel and the court met in
chambers the morning of the second day of trial, prior to the resumption of
testimony, to discuss jury instructions. The meeting was unrecorded. Tr. 351.
Counsel and the court also met in chambers during the mid-day recess, to discuss
instructions. That meeting was recorded. Tr. 344 f. On both occasions, objection
was made to State's proposed instruction 18. The following colloquy occurred
between defense counsel and the court:
[Mr. Baden]: Your Honor, for purposes of making a record, I would like to
read the proposed jury instruction. It states, "With respect to the charge of
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Aggravated Kidnaping, if the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Defendant seized, confined, detained, or transported a person as alleged, the State
has proven that element of the offense. Neither time nor distance or (sic) elements
of the offense of Aggravated Kidnaping. The law does not require the State to
prove a victim was seized, confined, detainedfor any particular amount of time or
transportedfor any particular distance... " (emphasis added).
Your Honor, I know that the proposed instruction is based on ... State v.
Perry [899 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1995)]. I wonder, though, to what extent the
holding in Perry should apply to this case....
...[WJhat's very troubling to me about the proposed instruction ... is that the
instruction here would seem to eliminate the jury in considering time and distance as
facts among the totality of facts in this case to help them reach a determination
whether there is a seizing, or ... an attempted seizing.
If the jury in this case is going to try to distinguish between a seizing and an
attempted seizing, it seems to me all the facts have to come into play, have to be
considered by the jury. Certainly, one of those facts is the time that, well, in this
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case, that somebody was scuffling with the victim. Also, I think what's a very
important fact in this case is the distance between the back gate and the back door
which the victim testified was only 15 to 18 feet and, therefore, would apply [sic]
only a very small time period. These time periods are certainly much less than the
four minutes that the victim in Perry case was restrained in the car at knife point.
...[T]he proposed instruction that the court wishes to give seems to me to,
arguably, go beyond the holding in Perry. And what's very troubling again, is that
it seems to deny the jury to look at the totality of facts, including time and distance,
in making a determination on the very important issue in this case of whether there
has been a seizing or attempting seizing.
...[The Court]: I am going to give the instruction that has been prepared, and
do that because I think it's in conformance with the Perry case. I believe that you
can talk about anything up to the point of seizure. You can argue seizure or
confinement, but you can't argue that it needs to be for a particular period of time or
that it didn't occur because it was of short duration.
...[Mr. Baden]: Your Honor, may I ask, am I precluded, in closing argument,
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as I would like to do, to argue time and talk again about literally the seconds that
went by in this incident?
[The Court]: You can talk about—you cannot argue that it didn't occur
because it wasn't a long enough distance, or that it wasn't enough time. ...Well,
before the seizure you can argue anything. And the jury should be given to
understand that all they want—I want them to understand once they have been
contained or restrained, or whatever it is, or transported, once they find any of those
things have occurred, they don't have to say he was transported 50 or 100 feet or a
mile. Doesn't make any difference. If they are transported, the first step meets the
statute. If they are detained, the first moment meets the statute. It's not-don't have
to prove anything more. That's what I thought I told you. Tr. 349,1. 1 to 354,1.5.
Harley believes that instruction 18, given over his objection, was error. "The
standard of review for jury instructions to which counsel has objected is
correctness." State v. Bryant, 349 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44 (CA, 8-13-98),

P.2d

(Utah App. 1998) (citation omitted). "[Correctness means the appellate court
decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's
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determination of law." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
Perry is significant because-on the surface at least-it appeared to deviate
from State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981) and eliminate temporal
considerations in the offense of aggravated kidnaping. Defendant in Couch had
been charged with both kidnaping and sexual assault. In response, he argued that to
be convicted of kidnaping there needed to be proof the detention was longer than
the minimum inherent in the commission of the sexual assault. Otherwise, the State
could transform virtually every sexual assault into a kidnaping, a more serious
offense with a heavier sentence. The court in Couch agreed. However, in Perry, an
aggravated kidnaping case, the court observed that the aggravated kidnaping statute
was devoid of a temporal element, as opposed to the kidnaping statute, which, in
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-301(1 )(a), makes reference to detaining or restraining
another "for any substantial period." The court stated, "Nowhere does this statute
require the victim be detained or restrained for any period of time before the crime
of aggravated kidnaping occurs. ...It is the element of restraint with the intent to
inflict injury or terrorize, not the length of restraint, which constitutes an aggravated
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kidnaping under Utah law" (emphasis in original). At 1242. Perry, seemingly,
stands for the proposition that time and distance are not factors in aggravated
kidnaping.
If so such a view is harsh and illogical. With defendant in Couch Harley
argues that a seizing or detaining is inherent in numerous crimes. Any robbery,
necessarily, involves a detaining. So too do sexual offenses. Without consideration
of the totality of the facts, including time and distance, all of those offenses suddenly
mutate and become aggravated kidnapings. Those accused face the possibility of
greater penalties than they would normally. For example robbery, a second degree
felony, punishable by 1-15 years imprisonment, is treated as aggravated kidnaping, a
first degree felony with a minimum mandatory sentence of six years, up to life.
Attempted aggravated robbery, also a second degree felony, is treated as aggravated
kidnaping with the same result.
B. Finlayson. and Time and Distance
Perhaps for these very reasons the court of appeals wisely has tempered
Perry. See State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283 (Utah App. 1998). Defendant in
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Finlayson was convicted of aggravated kidnaping, forcible sodomy and rape. The
court reversed the aggravated kidnaping conviction, holding that the detention
involved was not sufficiently independent of the sodomy and rape. At 289-90. In
determining the nature of the detention the court appeared to adopt, for the first time
in Utah, the three-part test found in State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d 720,
731 (Kan. 1976). To find that a detention or movement of a victim is significantly
independent of another crime, to justify a separate conviction for kidnaping, the
detention or movement '"(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely
incidental to the other crime; (b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the
other crime; and (c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in
that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially
lessens the risk of detection.'" At 289 (quoting Buggs).
Harley approves the apparent adoption of the Buggs test and believes that had
instruction 18 not been given and defense counsel been allowed to argue the totality
of facts at trial, including time and distance, the test in effect would have been
applied to his case and the result would have been different. While defense counsel
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was not allowed to proceed as he wished in closing argument, certain facts were
adduced at trial. Ted Jenkins testified that the scuffle that took place between him
and Harley and Gooch lasted a "very short time" and could have been only seconds
long. Tr. 200,11. 10-13. He also testified that the distance between the back gate,
near where the scuffle occurred, and the back door of the house, which was locked,
was fifteen to eighteen feet. Tr. 204,11. 1-6. Darrell Jenkins testified that after
hearing his father scream he ran over from his house in seconds. Tr. 225,1. 18 to
226,1. 11. Betty Jenkins testified, variously, that thirty to sixty seconds went by as
she heard her son's running, went outside and peaked around the corner of the
house, then went back into the house and phoned 911. Tr. 328,1. 25 to 330,1. 7.
Laconna Davis, the 911 operator, testified that she received Betty Jenkins' call at
10:18:28 p.m. and Darrell Jenkins' call, when he was in pursuit of Harley and
Gooch, at 10:19:42 p.m., some seventy-four seconds later. Tr. 263,11. 2-3 and 266,
1. 25 to 267,1. 4.
These facts, taken together, clearly demonstrate that Harley's detention of
Ted Jenkins and Darrell Jenkins was slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to
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another crime, arguably either attempted robbery or attempted burglary. The
detention, here, was inherent in the other crime. The detention did not make the
other crime substantially easier to commit or substantially less likely to be detected.
The Kansas Supreme Court in Buggs gives several illustrations of when
detention does or does not amount to kidnaping. Harley believes that one
illustration is particularly instructive: "'The forced direction of a store clerk to cross
the store to open a cash register is not a kidnaping; locking him in a cooler to
facilitate escape is.'" Quoted in Finlayson, id. He argues that moving Ted Jenkins
and Darrell Jenkins from the back gate to the back door of the house is analogous to
moving a store clerk from a spot in the store to the cash register. Such movement
may be part of another crime. It does not constitute kidnaping.
In sum, instruction 18 misstated the law. Time and distance, technically, are
not elements in the offense of aggravated kidnaping. However, they are not
irrelevant in determining whether a seizing, confining, detaining or transporting has
occurred that is significantly independent of another crime to justify a separate
conviction for kidnaping. Harley had the right to argue the totality of facts in his
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case, including time and distance, and attempt to convince the jury that he should
not be found guilty of two counts of aggravated kidnaping. Instruction 18, in
addition to misstating law, barred him from doing so. Defense counsel, in closing
argument, was precluded from arguing facts and suggesting to the jury that the
detention of Ted Jenkins and Darrell Jenkins did not rise to the level of aggravated
kidnaping within the meaning of the law. Had counsel been able to do so, there is a
strong possibility, at the very least, that the outcome of Harley's trial would have
been more favorable.
III.

THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE POSSESSION OF A
DANGEROUS WEAPON AND TAMPERING
WITH EVIDENCE CONVICTIONS.

Harley asserts finally that there was insufficient evidence to support his
possession of a dangerous weapon and tampering with evidence convictions.
Harley does not dispute that he was a convicted felon. He stipulated to this
fact as part of trial, in part to shield his criminal history from the jury and avoid any
visceral, negative reaction. However, Harley claims that the State did not adduce
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evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he had dominion or control over a
handgun. Conviction of a felony and dominion or control over a dangerous weapon
are the two essential elements of the crime of possession of a dangerous weapon,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a).
The evidence supporting the jury's verdict on this charge is limited to
testimony given by Darrell Jenkins. Jenkins testified that Harley had a pistol in his
hand at one point when Harley and Gooch confronted his father and him outside the
rear of the house. Tr. 214,11. 4-5. He also testified that it was Harley who lowered
the gun when Harley and Gooch decided to leave the scene. Tr. 217,11. 4-7.
This marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even when
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Darrell Jenkins gave conflicting
testimony as to whether Harley or Gooch had possession of the gun. Jenkins
testified at trial that Gooch, at least initially, had the gun in his hand. Tr. 214,1. 20.
He admitted, on cross-examination, that his testimony on this point appeared to be
inconsistent with a statement that he gave an investigating officer immediately after
the incident. Tr. 224,11. 3-11. Ted Jenkins testified that he himself never saw either
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Harley or Gooch with a gun. Tr. 204,11. 18-20; 207,11. 18-20. Betty Jenkins
testified that she never saw Harley or Gooch with a gun. Tr. 327,11. 17-19. The
gun that police recovered had no fingerprints on it, even though Harley, at the time
of his arrest, was not wearing rubber gloves. Tr. 306,11, 18-19; 249 f. A trace of
ownership of the gun, by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, failed to
establish any link between the gun and Harley. Tr. 307,1. 18 f.
Evidence that Harley adduced at trial was more than sufficient to establish
reasonable doubt in the jury regarding the element of Harley's dominion and control
over a gun. The jury, properly, should have found him not guilty of the charge of
possession of a dangerous weapon.
The jury also should have found Harley not guilty of the charge of tampering
with evidence, personally or as a party. The State admitted, in closing argument,
that "our weakest case is the evidence tampering case...." Tr. 375,11. 4-5. Indeed,
the only evidence supporting the jury's verdict on the charge was Darrell Jenkins'
testimony that Harley was the last person who had the gun when Harley and Gooch
left. Tr.217.
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All other evidence adduced by both the State and Harley supports the view
that Gooch, acting alone, threw the gun from the getaway vehicle. There can be no
doubt that there was a gun in the vehicle, whether or not Harley or Gooch had
possession of it during the interaction with Ted Jenkins and Darrell Jenkins. Police
observed a gun come out a window. However, it came out the passenger window.
Tr. 243,11. 20-21. Harley was driving. Gooch was sitting in the passenger seat. Tr.
278,11. 11-20; 246,11. 14-25. The van which Harley and Gooch were in had bucket
seats. Tr. 255,1. 10. There was a distance of two feet between the seats. Tr. 255,
11. 11-16. The gun was found within two feet of the edge of the pavement, just off
the road that Harley was on. Tr. 247,11. 1-5; 259,1. 22 to 260,1. 1. The reasonable
inference, the only reasonable inference, to be drawn from these facts is that Gooch
dropped the gun from the passenger window as the van was in motion. Harley
would have had to throw the gun across the inside of the vehicle, and across
Gooch's body, and with such force that it is unlikely that the gun would have landed
as close to the road as it did. This assumes, too, that Harley had the opportunity to
throw the gun out. Such a view is not supported by Darrell Jenkins' testimony that,
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as he followed the van, Harley was speeding up to 85 miles per hour. Tr. 220,1. 22
f.
The State adduced no evidence, and did not argue, that Harley asked, urged
or encouraged Gooch to throw the gun out the window. It based its argument,
again, on the claim that Harley was in possession of the gun when he and Gooch
prepared to leave the Jenkins' house. This one fact, even if true, is insufficient to
convict Harley of tampering with evidence, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510, beyond a
reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
The court should reverse Harley's convictions on all counts and remand the
case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
DATED this

l

day of November, 1998.

WESLEY M. BADEN
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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ADDENDUM

Attachment A
Aggravated Burglary, Aggravated Kidnaping, Possession of a Dangerous
Weapon, and Tampering with Evidence Statutes

76-6-203

CRIMINAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am J u r 2d Burglary
§ 10
C.J.S. — 12A C J S Burglary § 5
A.L.R. — Breaking and entering of inner
door of building as burglary, 43 A L R 3d 1147
Criminal prosecution based upon breaking

into or taking money or goods from vending
machine or other com operated machine, 45
A L R 3 d 1286
Mainta'nabihtv of burglarv charge, where
entry into building is made with consent, 58
A L R 4th 335

76-6-203. Aggravated burglary.
(1) Apersonisguilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or
fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the
crime,
ib) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against
any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon
(2) Aggra\ ated burglary is a first degree felony
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon** has the same definition as
under Section 76-1-601.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-203, e n a c t e d by L.
1973, c h . 196, $ 76-6-203; 1988, ch. 174, § 1;
1989, c h . 170, * 6.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Judgment.

ANALYSIS

—Effect of e r r o r .
Although the trial courts oral judgment of
"aggravated burglar\ a third degree felony
was in error as not conforming to the charge,
the jurv verdict, or the s t a t u t e because defen
dant's conviction was properh corrected in the
subsequent written judgment there was no
basis to amend the written judgment to conform to the oral judgment Parrv \ State, 837
P2d 998 (Utah Ct App 1992

Bodily injury
Evidence
—Sufficient
Intent
Judgment
—Effect of error
Lesser included offense
Liability of all participants
Sentencing
—Consideration of uncharged allegations
Weapon
—Possession
Cited
Bodily injury.
Defendant caused 'bodily injury" under this
section when he struck victim in the mouth
with a closed fist, knocking him off balance and
drawing blood State v Boone, 820 P2d 930
(Utah Ct App 1991)
Evidence.
—Sufficient.
Evidence was su^icient to prove the criminal
intent required for aggravated burglary State
v Featherson, 781 P2d 424 (1989)
Intent.
See notes under this catchline at § 76-6-202

L e s s e r i n c l u d e d offense.
Aggravated assault constituted a lesser and
included offense of aggravated burglarv where
the jury was instructed that to find defendant
guilty of aggravated burglarv it m u s t find that
he used or threatened the immediate use of a
dangerous or deadly weapon against a person
and the j u r y was not required to find any
additional elements to convict defendant of
aggravated assault once it had found him guilty
of aggravated burglarv State % Bradlev, 752
P2d 874 (Utah 1988) "
Liability of all participants.
A defendant was properly charged with aggravated burglary based on the fact that another participant in the crime w a? know inglv in
possession of a dangerous weapon State v
Seel, 827 P 2 d 954 (Utah Ct App J. cert denied,
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OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON

76-5-301.1.

76-5-302

Child kidnaping.

(1) A person commits child kidnaping when the person intentionally or
knowingly, without authority of law and against the will of the victim, hy any
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, or transports a child under
the age of 14 with intent to keep or conceal the child from its parent, guardian,
or other person having lawful custody or control of the child.
(2) A seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation is deemed to be
against the will of the victim if the victim is younger than 14 years of age at the
time of the offense, and the seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation,
is without the effective consent of the victim's custodial parent, guardian, or
person acting in loco parentis.
(3) Violation of Section 76-5-303 is not a violation of this section
(4) Child kidnaping is a felony of the first degree punishable by a term
which is a minimum mandatory term of imprisonment of 5, 10, or 15 years, and
which may be for life
History: C. 1953. 78-5-301.1, e n a c t e d by L.
1983, ch. 88, $ 14; 1984, ch. 18, * fi.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Evidence.
Constitutionality
Evidence
—Admissible
Cited
Constitutionality.
Subsection (4) is not unconstitutional (1) it is
not cruel and unusual punishment on the theory that the sentences are disproportionate to
the crime of kidnaping, (2> it does not infringe
on inherent judicia power and authonty, (3) it
does not invade trie provnce of the Board of
Pardons, and 14 t r e sentencing scheme is not
^constitutional^ -.ague ^tate v Shickles, 760
fia zyi t u t a n I^*-*

—Admissible.
Evidence of defendant's sexual assaults on
the victim were properly admitted at his trial
for child kidnaping, because the evidence was
directly probative of the proposition that defendant took the victim out of the state with the
requisite intent and without a good faith belief
that he had implied permission from the child's
parents State v Shickles, 760 P2d 291 (Utah
1988)
C i t e d in State v Bishop, 717 P2d 261 (Utah
1986)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Liahilif. of legal or natural parent,
or one who aids and aheis for damages resultu g from abduction A own child, 49 A L R 4th 7

76-5-302. Aggravated k i d n a p i n g .
Q) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the person intentionally or
knowingly, without authority of law and against the will of the victim, by any
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, or transports the victim
with intent
(a) to huld for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to compel
a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging
in particular conduct; or
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76-5-303

CRIMINAL CODE

(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after
commission or attempted commission of a felony; or
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terronze the victim or another, or
(d) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political
function; or
(e) to commit a sexual offense as described in Part 4 of this chapter
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the result of force, threat, or deceit
if the victim is mentally incompetent or younger than sixteen years and the
detention or moving is accomplished without the effective consent of the
victim's custodial parent, guardian, or person acting in loco parentis to the
victim.
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a felony of the first degree punishable by a term
which is a minimum mandatory term of imprisonment of 5, 10, or 15 years and
which may be for life.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-302, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-302; 1974, ch. 32, § 12;
1983, ch. 88, § 15.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Sentence.

Lesser included offenses
~ AA ,
.
—Constitutionality
Tr i i,
Cited

-Constitutionality.
The aggravated kidnaping minimum manda.
*
., .
,
tory sentencing provision is constitutional
S t a t e v Russell
791 P 2 d 188 ( U t a h 1990)
>

Lesser included offenses.
Defendant charged with aggravated kidnapmg was entitled to a jury instruction on assault
as a lesser included offense since there was
sufficient overlap in elements of two offenses
and if jury had accepted defendant's version of
evidence, however unlikely that might have
been, it could have voted to acquit him of
aggravated kidnaping and to convict him of
assault State v Brown, 694 P2d 587 (Utah
1984)

—Upheld.
Concurrent 15-year minimum mandatory
sentences for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault found not cruel and
unusual punishment See State v Russell, 791
P2d 188 (Utah 1990)
Cited in State v DePlonty, 749 P2d 621
(Utah 1987), State v Babbell, 770 P2d 987
(Utah 1989), State v Archuleta, 850 P2d 1232
(Utah 1993)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 5 1 C J S Kidnapping § 1
AX.R. — What is "harm" within provisions

of statutes increasing penalty for kidnaping
where victim suffers harm, 11 A L R 3d 1053

76-5-303. Custodial interference.
(1) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custodial interference if,
without good cause, the actor takes, entices, conceals, or detains a child under
the age of 16 from its parent, guardian, or other lawful custodian
(a) knowing the actor has no legal right to do so; and
(b) with intent to hold the child for a period substantially longer than
the visitation or custody period previously awarded by a court of competent jurisdiction.
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OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY

76-10-503

76-10-502. When weapon deemed loaded.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
C i t e d in State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446
(Utah 1995).

76-10-503.

Purchase
or possession
of
dangerous
weapon/handgun — Persons not permitted to
have — Penalties.

(1) (a) Any person who h a s been convicted of any crime of violence under
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government,
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-10-501.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off
shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have
in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as
defined in Section 76-10-501.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive, or incendiary
device he is guilty of a second degree felony.
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun
described in this part who:
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the
United States, this state, or any other state;
(ii) is under indictment;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in
Section 58-37-2;
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution;
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions; or
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States,
has renounced such citizenship,
(b) Any person who violates this Subsection (3) is guilty of a third
degree felony.
.History: C. 1953, 76-10-503, e n a c t e d by L.
1973, ch. 196, $ 76-10-503; 1977, ch. 82, § 1;
1986, ch. 210, § 1; 1990, ch. 160, § 1; 1991,
ch. 17, § l ; 1 9 9 1 , c h . 8 7 , § 5; 1993, ch. 62, § 2;
1994, ch. 19, § 2; 1994, ch. 149, § 2; 1997, ch.
289, § 12.

A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, substituted "Section 76-10-501" for "this part" in Subsections
(IMa) and (2)(a) and made a stylistic change in
Subsection (3)(b).

OFFENSES AGAINST ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT

76-8-510

76-8-509. Extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding.
(1) A person is guilty of a felony of the second degree if by the use of force or
by any threat which would constitute a means of committing the crime of theft
by extortion under this code, if the threat were employed to obtain property, or
by promise of any reward or pecuniary benefits, he attempts to induce an
alleged victim of a crime to secure the dismissal of or to prevent the filing of a
criminal complaint, indictment, or information.
(2) "Victim," as used in this section, includes a child or other person under
the care or custody of a parent or guardian.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-509, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-509.
Cross-References. — Accepting bribe, or

bribery, to prevent criminal prosecution, § 768-308.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 31A Am. Jur. 2d Extortion,
Blackmail, and Threats § 50.
C.J.S. — 86 C.J S. Threats and Unlawful
Communications § 4.

A.L.R. — Criminal liability of corporation for
extortion, false pretenses, or similar offense, 49
A.L R.3d 820
Key Numbers. — Threats «=» 1(1).

76-8-510. Tampering with evidence.
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, believing that an official
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he:
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a purpose to
impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation; or
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything which he knows to be false with
a purpose to deceive a public servant who is or may be engaged in a
proceeding or investigation.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-510, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-510.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
evidence of guilt was so slight, so conflicting,
and so inherently improbable that reasonable
minds could not have concluded that defendant
rejected a fire investigation report in an attempt to alter, destroy, conceal or remove it to
impair its verity or availability, rather than
rejecting it because it was a "bad report." State
v Harman, 767 P.2d 567 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

ANALYSIS

Evidence.
—Admissibility.
—Insufficient.
—Sufficient.
Evidence.
—Admissibility.
Defendant's swallowing a bag that the police
had taken into custody impaired the availability of that evidence for any resulting proceeding
or investigation irrespective of its admissibility
against defendant at trial. State v. Wagstaff,
846 R2d 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
—Insufficient.
Defendant's conviction of attempted tampering with evidence was reversed, because the

— Sufficient.
Evidence that a police officer had intentionally manipulated a breathalyzer machine in
order to obtain a false reading was sufficient to
sustain a conviction for tampering with evidence. State v. Eaton, 701 P.2d 496 (Utah 1985).
Evidence was sufficient for jury to conclude
that defendant knowingly or intentionally attempted to induce a fire marshal to withhold a
report on a fire from an official investigation or
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Attachment B
State's Concession, at Preliminary Hearing,
that Harley Did Not Enter the Jenkins' House

1

that night after listening to counsel, Judge.

2

counsel's more technical arguments regarding Mr. Gooch.

3

believe the testimony was that he was the passenger in the

4

vehicle.

5

charged him as being a party to having possession of a

6

firearm.

7

the preliminary hearing on that one.

8
9
10

I'll respond to
I

The gun was thrown out the passenger side. We have

I think there is sufficient evidence to get us past

THE COURT:

I don't think you can charge him with

being a party to that offense.
MS. STRINGHAM:

I wondered about that.

But we

11

still have the evidence that he was in the passenger side.

12

The gun went out the window, I would like to remind the Court,

13

probably don't have to with the Pledger cases and the

14

inferences that should be made in favor of the State.

15

as the conviction goes, it shows that he was convicted for

16

five years to the Texas Department of Corrections.

17

over one year is usually considered felony punishment in this

18

state and other states.

19

As far

Anything

I have not read the case cited by Mr. Baden.

Just

20

-- and I would like that opportunity to do that if the Court's

21

inclined to agree with his reasoning.

22

the plain meaning of the statute, the plain meaning of

23

aggravated burglary, plain language is a person is guilty of

24

aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing or fleeing

25

from a burglary, the actor or another participant causes

Your Honor, looking at
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1

bodily injury to any person or uses or threatens the immediate

2

use of a dangerous weapon.

3

would submit, the legislature intentionally broadened it

4

because when a dangerous weapon is used it's a much more

5

serious situation.

6

attempt, committing, or fleeing from a burglary.

7

case, there was no entry into the house, but there certainly

8

was an attempt. We have the testimony that at least one of

9

these defendants, probably both of these defendants repeatedly

The aggravated burglary statute, I

They have broadened that to include

10

said, Get in the house.

11

were held at gun-point for 13 to 15 minutes, forced to walk to

12

the back of the house.

13

statutory definition of attempting to commit a burglary.

14

also have Mr. Harley's interview where he said that they were

15

going to get 1- to $3 million that was hidden somewhere.

16

have the fact that these two defendants arrived at the scene

17

with all of the material necessary to subdue people.

18

the gun, they had the duct tape.

19

Let's get in the house.

So in this

The gun was held on them.

The Jenkins

It fits the
We

We

They had

They had two -- Mr. Harley had two pair of

20

handcuffs on his person.

We have rope. We have a flashlight.

21

We have everything that you would normally think of as being

22

used to subdue people and keep them under their control.

23

doesn't matter whether or not Mr. Jenkins, the Jenkinses or

24

whether or not these defendants thought they were committing a

25

robbery.

That doesn't matter.

It

The Court has to look at the
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1

fact that it shouldn't matter at all, legal elements of each

2

crime.

3

aggravated burglary and the aggravated kidnapping.

4

much more than just an interaction, Judge, when people are

5

held at gun-point.

6

with something, his arms twisted back, believed they were

7

trying to get both arms behind him, forced at gun-point to go

8

to the back door, I believe we have more than met our burden

9

for purposes of preliminary hearing.

And I would submit that this crime definitely fits the

When Mr. Jenkins is smashed in the head

10

THE COURT:

11

MS. BARTON-COOMBS:

12

This was

Thank you.
Your Honor, may I say two

things?

13

THE COURT: Yes.

14

MS. BARTON-COOMBS:

First of all, Your Honor, it

15

appears to me from the paper that Mrs. Stringham submitted on

16

Mr. Gooch that the original charge of possession of heroin was

17

dismissed, and that was the charge that had the five year

18

sentence.

19

appears to have a two year sentence.

20

That the marijuana charge that he was convicted of

Second of all, there has been no testimony that the

21

items, that the coat that the items were found in upon arrest

22

were worn by Mr. Harley at the scene, that the items

23

Mr. Jenkins was discussing were recovered from the coat

24

Mr. Harley was wearing 40 miles up the canyon, Your Honor.

25

there is no evidence that any of the items, the handcuffs,

So
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